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Executive Registry

63-6322

2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT : Comments on the DD/I Proposed Office
of Strategic Problems


As you know, Ray Cline and I have discussed this proposal regularly over the past year so that my views are fairly well developed at this time. The proposal certainly has merit in that it would guarantee a sharply-focused estimate on the Soviet scientific threat, i. e., 11-8 and probably also 11-1 and 11-3. However, it creates the following problems, which to my mind far overshadow this advantage:

a) Integration of this product at the level of a line organization will tend to duplicate the regular efforts of the Board of National Estimates. In my view, it will undermine the reliability of that concept in other fields and over a period of time will cause other Agencies to question the role of the National Board of Estimates as an integrator of contributions from various offices and Agencies. I think that we should always be alive to the implications of spoon-feeding complete Estimates to the Board lest other Agencies insist on the same right in their own fields of demonstrated expertise.

b) Such an Office will provide the DIA with a sharp focus for any objections it may have to CIA's being heavily engaged in the military and scientific threat problem. If we are willing to run this gauntlet, we should also amalgamate our political analysts in OCI and ONE into a parallel office. It is my understanding that the DD/I is reluctant to do so because of the vehement objections he believes State Department would raise, and I believe the situation is exactly parallel in this case.

c) Integrating economic, scientific, technical and military

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analysts into a single line organization will present a major professional problem for the leader of that organization. He will necessarily be hard put to supply the professional leadership and stimulation to the components of his line organization. It is my understanding that the DD/I proposes to offer this job to [] and this would assure, at least for his tenure, a continued understanding of scientific and technical problems. On the other hand, it would not do the same for the economic and military people. Subsequent directors could logically be expected to be generalists, economists, military or political analysts, who would naturally lend special emphasis to their own disciplines in succession. The natural human limitations of individuals, their energies and intellectual spans make me very doubtful that one man can ever be expected to simultaneously and adequately carry forward the momentum in each one of these areas to the extent necessary.

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d) A separation of the Life Sciences Division and the General Sciences Division into a separate unit is bound to lead to their isolation from the affairs of the DD/I and the Office of Strategic Problems. It is my view and those of the Division Chiefs involved that these organizations would very quickly deteriorate in effectiveness and capability, and we can confidently predict that the good people would quickly leave these Divisions so isolated. What is more, these groups have a very important contribution to make in supporting the longer range aspects of the problems to be grouped under the Office of Strategic Problems.

e) However, the most pressing current unsolved problem in DD/I is the non-Soviet problem. By its very definition, the Office of Strategic Problems would be focused first and foremost on the Soviet scientific threat; but it would also care for the emerging and disturbing nuclear weapons programs in [] or would these be handled by an Office of Tactical Problems? The connection between basic scientific capability and weapons programs is probably more apparent in the smaller countries which are first embarking on these programs, and I believe that there the separation of GSD and LSD from this problem would be even more serious.

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f) All of my efforts during the last year have been devoted to creating, sustaining and accelerating the momentum of a genuine professional approach to analyzing scientific and technical intelligence information so as to settle the key technical questions in all of the Estimates. The answers to these questions lie in detailed and usually painstaking scientific analysis of engineering information. Effective integration has not contributed to the solution of one such problem thus far, nor is it likely to in our estimation. We already have two very effective Offices devoted to integration: OCI for perishable commodities, and ONE for thoughtful judgments. What is needed is an Agency capability, founded in a progressive and sharpened professional environment, able to cope with the technical questions of our estimates and current reporting as they occur.

(dictated but not signed by)

ALBERT D. WHEELON
Assistant Director/Office of Scientific Intelligence

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

AD/SI

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

2 August 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

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Exec. Director

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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A very compelling
paper — do we
need do anything with
it except embalm for
posterity? No.


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